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ABSTRACT
With smartphone technology’s enhanced way of interacting with the world around us, it has also been
paving the way for easier access to our private and personal information. This has been amplified
by the existence of numerous embedded sensors utilized by millions of apps to users. While mobile
apps have positively transformed many aspects of our lives with new functionalities, many of these
applications are taking advantage of vast amounts of data, privacy apps, a form of Privacy-Enhancing
Technology can be an effective privacy management tool for smartphones. To protect against
vulnerabilities related to the collection, storage, and sharing of sensitive data, developers are building
numerous privacy apps. However, there has been a lack of discretion in this particular area which
calls for a proper assessment to understand the far-reaching utilization of these apps among users.
During this process we have conducted an evaluation of the most popular privacy apps from our total
collection of five hundred and twelve to demonstrate their functionality specific data protections they
are claiming to offer, both technologically and conventionally, measuring up to standards. Taking
their offered security functionalities as a scale, we conducted forensic experiments to indicate where
they are failing to be consistent in maintaining protection. For legitimate validation of security gaps
in assessed privacy apps, we have also utilized NIST and OWASP guidelines. We believe this study
will be efficacious for continuous improvement and can be considered as a foundation towards a
common standard for privacy and security measures for an app’s development stage.
Keywords Privacy, Privacy enhancing tools, Privacy apps, Digital Forensic, Security and privacy standards.
1 Introduction
Information security and privacy is an issue concerned with the proper supervision of data consent, notice, and
regulations. More specifically, practical data privacy concerns often revolve around a few common questions: "How
data is legally collected or stored?” and “Whether or how data is shared with different parties?" On-going research
into information security and privacy strives to pin down frequent issues related to information security violations and
possible solutions [1]. Recently discussed topics on use of technology such as contact tracing, quarantine tracker for
combating COVID-19 [2] are one of few most critical aspects where data handling is such a big concerns. Data is one
of the most important assets, companies and governments are concerned about. With the ever-growing amount of data
in online space, companies find enormous value in collecting, sharing, processing, and using data for their own use.
Big tech giants such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, and eBay have been building their billion-dollar empires
atop the data economy. In this data life-cycle, transparency in requesting consent, abiding by privacy policies, and
managing and collecting data are important requirements for building trust and accountability with customers who
expect privacy. While we have different ways to ensure the privacy of our physical data, we are losing control over
our digital data by various means. We are frequently giving up a vast amount of sensitive information and revealing
pieces of our existence on digital platforms. All online spaces we enter glean some aspect of our personal information.
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Different parties connect the pieces of information for mapping a very detailed personal profile and slowly manipulating
us into changing our cognition on certain topics in different digital communication platform. We are aware from history
that knowledge of someone’s ethnic background, political or religious beliefs can be life threatening if it falls into the
wrong hands. One of the many events that several researchers have argued relates to the topic of privacy violation
and autonomy is the 2016 United States Presidential Election [3], [4]. According to its study, Cambridge Analytica’s
methods of data collection and commercial use represent significant violations of personal autonomy and privacy, which
is stated as psychological traits and, in particular, behavioral microtargeting [3], [4]. It may also seem unusual when
you and your friends pay different airfares because of the zipcode they live in. These real-life cases make it clear that
our data security and privacy in online has been taken away gradually. Moreover, cyber-attacks such as, phishing email
[5], social engineering strategies for spear phishing [6] are evolving with technological advancement which are paving
the way for attackers to trap users to get into their system for getting access of their personal information. Therefore,
new threat landscapes are being spread so frequently to be addressed.
The widespread usage of smartphones is allowing the data life-cycle to be used more efficiently for data collectors and
leaving other parties (e.g., users, consumers) helpless. A Smartphone’s ability to create easier modes of communication
via instant messaging, mobile browsers, highly functioning cameras is allowing data collectors to grasp the information
of users. Mobile apps are taking this process one step forward by advanced processing capabilities to store and process
sensitive information as well, such as the user’s location, lists of contacts, and personal photographs, which require
adequate protection. A form of privacy-enhancing technology – privacy apps have been designed to play an important
role in providing privacy-preserving environments with privacy mechanism, for example, smart encryption, secure
session management, secure inter-process communication, and secure transport layers. To date, privacy apps are
not explored on their privacy-preserving computation protocols [7] and to the best of our knowledge, there is not
enough analysis of privacy apps’ mechanisms and how they keep up to the privacy requirement standards in their
base development process. While ensuring security and privacy involves developer industries, users, and government
where each of these entities relies on others, this process requires consideration of both technology and regulations.
Therefore, it is fair for any party to question if the necessary security and privacy mechanisms are in place they are
supposed to or claimed to offer based on their service [8]. We have encountered literature where different self-made
guidelines, catalogues and practices in different app industries on their development life cycle which may create
conflicts of interest and will put the privacy of users at stake [9]. To put our understanding on point, we explored
existing guidelines and frameworks which can provide certain requirements/criteria lists for ensuring security and
privacy for mobile OS, in particularly, NIST.SP.800-163 for "Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications" [10]. NIST is
a non-regulatory government agency that develops technology, metrics, and standards to drive innovation and economic
competitiveness at U.S.-based organizations in the science and technology industry that assists in protecting information
[11]. Compliance with NIST standards and guidelines has become a top priority in many high-tech industries.
In our research, we have outlined our project for analysis of these “Privacy App” from forensics and policy point
of view. For the part of forensic, we first utilized automated framework MobSF(Mobile Security Framework) for
detecting app specific security and privacy concerns, followed by rigorous dynamic analysis to highlight vulnerabilities
on information, accessibility, and transmission, purpose of requesting and processing it. We have also utilized testing
tools (fiddler, SSL labs) for measuring the safety of data transmission and communication in run-time. Finally, we
utilized NIST.SP.800− 163, OWASP guidelines, Solove’s Privacy Taxonomy [12] as a mixed method approach to
assign how these “Privacy apps’” modules and components are keeping up with data protection component and if they
are satisfying those requirements for ensuring security and privacy. Our goal of systematic evaluation of privacy apps
is to identify missing pieces from both security and privacy point of view for developing novel frameworks to help
identify and mitigate the security and privacy risks [13] that arise from smartphones applications in the long run.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we extensively reviewed security and privacy related research on smartphone
app to indicate why there still needs to consider additional techniques for preserve privacy framework. With substantial
research evidence of apps security and privacy concerns and area for future scopes, in section 3, we designed our
experiment model to conduct our assessment in 3 different ways (manual, static and dynamic). According to our model
of analysis, we further described our steps independently for better clarification with retrieved results in section 4. In
section 5, we took an additional approach for conferring our analyzed results with well-developed existing security and
privacy guidelines (NIST, OWASP, Solve’s Taxonomy) which has been recommend to be taken under consideration by
researcher in case of security and privacy for a long time now. In Section 6 discusses our findings and implications,
followed by a conclusion in section 7.
2 Background
Apple App Store and the Google Play Store are two most important marketplaces in the world for publishing apps.
The popularity of smartphones is constantly growing, with an increased demand for applications that has resulted in
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serious privacy concerns. Smartphones’ advanced processing capabilities are allowing most apps to store and process
sensitive identifiable information. People are using different kind of apps for their daily life, even without realizing
the potential negative impact. Mobile phones’ progressive adoption in people’s daily activities is shaping and defining
mobile computing outburst. To get this situation under control, it is time to address apps’ privacy issues and identify
primary concerns from privacy and security point of views. In previous scholarly research and published studies, we
have found assessments of privacy risks and analyses of particular types of apps, for example, mHealth, fitness apps
and ebanking apps, etc. Those analyzed apps are mostly from the Android marketplace. Most of them considered
doing their evaluation in terms of examining if apps have satisfied the current security and privacy legislation, and
standards and certifications for security and privacy [14],[15]. For our research, we have considered the privacy risks
and suggested mechanisms recorded by NIST [16] and OWASP 1 . For our experiment, we chose iOS privacy apps
to better understand the particular privacy mechanisms for certain privacy vulnerabilities which may not be present
in regular apps. We explored the details about iOS application structure, Inter-process communication (IPC), iOS
application publishing, and iOS application attacks from Apple developers’ documentation.
iOS is isolated in comparison to Android and has a mandatory access control (MAC) mechanism, with IPC options
to minimize potential attacks. The iOS platform offers privacy and data protection advantages through uniform
hardware/software integration, secure boot, hardware-backed keychain 2 , and file system encryption3. Despite having
built-in security measures for apps, iOS app developers still need to worry about data protection because of the
availability of mobile devices and the different sensors associated with apps installed on them. There is a varied amount
of concern related to data protection, keychain management, Touch ID/Face ID authentication, and network security
layers from functional as well as non-functional points of view. Keeping those in mind, there still needs to be security
and privacy testing and reverse engineering for proper validation of security measures, including how they are working
on run-time and how vulnerabilities can cause fatal privacy threats to users’ personal information. An iOS application
attack surface consists of all components of the application, including the supportive material necessary to release
the app and to support its functioning. During this process, iOS application may be vulnerable to attack if it does
not: validate all input by means of IPC communication or URL-schemes; validate all input by the user in input fields;
validate the content loaded inside a WebView; Securely communicate with backend servers to avoid being susceptible
to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks between the server and the mobile application; securely store all local data, or
load untrusted data from storage; and protect itself against compromised environments, repackaging or other local
attacks. After having all the advanced technologies included as part of a built-in design model in iOS, there still remain
vulnerable situations stemming from smartphones’ sensors to gaining access to users’ information.
We also found evidence of severe vulnerabilities that remained unaddressed and several new privacy issues from existing
studies and different reports. According to their findings mobile apps are still vulnerable to attacks and complete
security is not quite an achievable task, even when enforcing privacy and security requirements [17]. There are many
well-known popular apps that process massive amounts of sensitive data for big data analytics and yet fail to provide
basic protection of users’ privacy due to their inappropriate implementation, poor design choices and lack of proper
of guidelines from a validated organization (e.g., NIST, IAPP) [16], [18]. There is an emerging shift toward mobile
applications where the goal is to make life more comfortable in respect to health service, banking, shopping, fitness,
and even dating [14], [19], [20]. This noticeable growth of mobile apps comes with growing concern for users’ data
privacy on their mobile devices. According to a Homeland Security study on mobile device security, threats to the
Government’s use of mobile devices are real and exist across all elements of the mobile ecosystem 4. In order to ensure
some level of privacy protection for mobile phone and app users, there is another kind of app that is being developed
called privacy apps – a form of privacy enhancing technology. To preserve privacy and give users data protection 5,
there are many privacy enhancing technologies already available [21]. App developers are also designing different
privacy apps to give protection to categorized data, for example, privacy apps for photos, videos, passwords, browsers,
and adblocking. However, it is still questionable if those privacy apps actually protect privacy or are perhaps taking
away part of users’ data, and sharing and processing it for their own benefits. From a technological point of view, other
concerns can be added to the earlier one: are those privacy apps following proper guidelines at their development phase,
and are those guidelines comprehensive for all of the privacy apps out there? As those are intended to ensure privacy to
users, it is necessary to analyze if those apps are including adequate privacy mechanisms and how secure those apps
1OWASP Mobile Top 10. Retrieved from https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/
2Apple. iOS Security. Retrieved from https://www.apple.com
3Apple App developers Documentation. Retrieved from https://developer.apple.com/documentation/uikit
4 Homeland Security. Study on Mobile Device Security. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/
5Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada. Privacy Enhancing Technologies – A Review of Tools and Techniques. Retrieved
from https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/
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are to use. IAPP compares different guidelines for mobile applications in terms of privacy, security, data collection,
retention, notice, and consent 6.
In this study, we are mainly utilizing Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) which is an automated, open source
pen-testing framework capable of performing static, dynamic and malware analysis. This is mostly recommended
for static analysis of security in mobile applications. It can be used for effective and fast security analysis of iOS
mobile applications and supports IPA binary and zipped source code. It has a web service that consists of a dashboard
which presents the results of the analysis, a documentation site, an integrated emulator, and an API that allows users to
trigger the analysis automatically. For dynamic analyses, we used Fiddler, an HTTP debugging proxy server application
that can record data shared over HTTP and other vendors and measure security. We have also utilized SSL Labs
(https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/) from Qualys. SSL verification is necessary to ensure certificate parameters are
as expected. There are multiple ways to check the SSL certificate for our analyses. After performing the analyses,
we employed NIST mobile privacy guidelines to compare and contrast with three different analyses results. We
utilized NIST guidelines for mobile apps privacy and security and OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide [22],[23]
for analyzing selected privacy apps concerning privacy and security. Our goal is to provide systematic feedback about
privacy mechanisms to the developers of those apps. We are analyzing privacy mechanisms of the selected apps to
check if they meet the requirements of NIST guidelines and, at the same time, we are studying the comprehensiveness
of our utilized mobile testing framework MobSF. Because of the ubiquitous terminology of "privacy" in our modern
technology, it is challenging to address privacy issues within our existing testing framework. While we are using NIST
and OWASP apps privacy guideline requirements, we are also pinpointing some of the requirements which are present
in our guidelines but are not present in our experiment environment.
3 Methodology
In this section, we first present our overall app collection and criteria for selecting manageable counts of apps. Our
experiments have been conducted on iOS privacy apps. Secondly, we describe how we conducted the assessment
for investigating the security and privacy components offered by each app. We conducted our assessment with three
different types of experiments: manual, static and dynamic analysis by the help of OWASP Mobile Security Testing
Guide. In addition to providing a finding’s report, we performed a NIST guideline auditing procedure to determine
whether the reviewed apps have the privacy mechanisms needed to combat against the current threats landscape. To
accomplish the analysis, our method includes two parts: data collection and analyses (Manual analysis, Static code
Analysis, dynamic/ run-time analysis). Figure 1 presents the overall apps collection with our assigned categories.
During our research, experiments progress through recording the results from frameworks for each apps and comparing
their mechanisms to our selected guidelines. In the manual analyses, three kinds of assessments are done to assess
general features, policies, and privacy settings. In the static analysis, we evaluated apps’ privacy mechanisms by mobile
security testing framework. To organize our overall set-up, we referenced research on apps security testing in different
areas like mhealth, dating apps, fitness apps, followed by research on developers’ views of testing before releasing apps.
We studied their methodology to have detailed insights on testing [24], [25], [26], [27]. The following sections will
briefly present our methodology.
3.1 Data Sampling
For performing an initial screening of possible applications of privacy, we collected 532 apps from the App Store. We
used a variety of keywords to find relevant apps, including, ”Privacy,” ”Data Protection,” ”Hide,” ”Block,” ”Conceal-
ment,” ”Confidentiality,” ”Privateness,” ”Seclusion,” and ”Solitude.” We used certain specifics (e.g., language used,
review count, ratings, category, prices and short description of their functionalities) to select the most suitable ones for
assessment. Our total initial collection introduced us privacy apps of different categories, for example, photo and video
privacy apps, VPN/ Wifi privacy, password manager, transmission and encryption, ad blocking, document/file privacy
and others. Figure 1 provides a presentation of our collected apps’ data.
To identify, collect, and evaluate a manageable number of privacy apps, we determined our initial inclusion criteria.
We chose those apps which are free, with instructions written in English, with a review count of more than 10798
(where 10798 is the mean of review counts of the total listed 532 apps), and with an overall rating higher than 3.5. By
applying the inclusion criteria, (price, language, review count, rating) we ended up selecting 50 apps. Table 1 includes
the inclusion criteria. However, 50 apps were still not a manageable number for in-depth analysis. Depending on our
experiment, we choose to select apps that belong to six main areas of privacy: (i) Browsing privacy apps, (ii) VPN and
WiFi Privacy apps, (iii) Photos and Videos Privacy apps, (iv) Password Privacy apps, (v) Ad blocking apps and (vi)
6iapp. COMPARISON OF MOBILE APPLICATION GUIDE- LINES.Retrieved from https://iapp.org/resources/comparison-of-
mobileapplication-guidelines/
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Figure 1: Collected data of iOS privacy apps
Texting Privacy apps. We are utilizing mobile testing framework and automated tools for our complete set of analysis
(static and dynamic). Based on the criteria mentioned in table 1, we decided to select a total of 12 apps belonging to the
6 main categories, which are also open source. We selected our final apps for better comparison and contrast in regard
to finding out the comprehensiveness of their privacy components. In our research, we have not directly mentioned
name or other identifiers of analyzed apps. Therefore, we have decided to refer them as App 1 to App 12.
Table 1: Inclusion Criteria
Criterion Type of Criterion
Criterion 1 Content must be in English
Criterion 2 Apps must be free
Criterion 3 Apps review counts ≥ 10798
Criterion 4 Apps rating should be ≥ 3.5
3.2 Assessment Methodology
In this section, we designed our assessment strategy for evaluating the privacy mechanisms of the 12 collected
categorized privacy apps. Particularly, we aimed to answer the following three main research questions:
What kind of privacy mechanism they are providing for protecting users’ information in respect to our selected
guideline NIST?
What can be suggested to the app developer to consider while designing privacy for those apps?
To find the answers for those above questions, we designed the following assessment strategies to carry on our
experiment.
1. We first registered and installed all 12 selected apps from iOS App Store onto our experimental iOS device.
Some of them required a valid Apple ID to create an app specific account during installation. We carefully
read all the each apps general information and privacy mechanisms mentioned in the apps’ specific page
and, if needed, their particular redirected websites for more concrete information. After installation, we
again carefully went through all scopes and objectives of each app in terms of privacy settings, (for example,
registration, lock, authentication, key management, homepage privacy tips, auto lock, auto-clear when logout)
to accurately design the whole process of our evaluation for conducting manual analysis.
2. After a general characteristics evaluation, we inspected different types of permissions those apps automatically
turned in from users’ devices. In addition, we inspected privacy policies from apps’ web pages to check if
they mentioned those permissions that they asked for or if it automatically turned on in users’ devices. We
also carefully noted those apps that did not have a detailed privacy policy on the App Store. As far as we
know Apple requires all apps to have a privacy policy since October 3, 2018. They do not allow new apps
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Figure 2: Scheme of the overall experiment
to be accepted without a privacy policy, and existing apps will not be able to be updated without one. This
requirement is strict, regardless of whether apps collect personal information from users or not.
3. After manual analysis, we completed an automated static code analysis utilizing framework MobSF (Mobile
Security Framework). In this step, we have analyzed the IPA files on the framework to identify possible privacy
and security vulnerabilities highlighted by different analyzers (binary analysis, security analysis) present in
MobSF. We recorded our identified issues found on the static analyzer which are important to consider in
building a comprehensive privacy design for apps, particularly privacy apps.
4. In this step, we performed a dynamic analysis for each app using Fiddler, a well-known web debugging proxy
set-up. Every app was installed and tested to achieve the most accurate results of each app’s performance at
the time of its dynamic analysis. We also studied the manual communication of each app and third parties in
terms of data transmission and sharing. In the design scheme of our overall experiment, represented in Figure
2, this particular analysis is on the right side of the clients. This experiment’s main idea is to find out the data
collected from users’ devices and their input through apps and how that information flows through different
media and third parties.
5. After finding transmission and communication channels, we analyzed the web server configuration to determine
the privacy and security level of HTTPS data transmission. For this examination and scoring of the web server
configuration, we chose to use a free on-line service, SSL Labs, which enables remote testing of a web server’s
security measures and privacy effectiveness against a host of current threats and vulnerabilities.
6. After having examined the apps with these three tools from different points of view, for example, quality
of communication channel, transport layer security, generated apps permission, distribution of data among
different media as static and manual analysis, we recorded and inspected privacy apps’ mechanisms in
terms of security architecture, application structure, inter-process communication, application publishing and
application attack surface.
7. In this step, we summarized our findings for each app. In addition, we compared and contrasted those findings
with NIST and OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide requirements for iOS apps privacy and security.
8. Finally, based on finding related to the latest NIST requirements and OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide
requirements, we performed a number of checks in order to make some recommendations and suggestions
for app developers, as well as for the mobile apps testing Framework community, to reconsider necessary
modifications and changes for further improvement.
Based on our overall analysis, our aim is to make sure that those apps are including privacy mechanisms as they claim
in their apps’ information page, and therefore to make suggestions for developer to follow proper privacy guidelines. In
addition, we also attempted to take the NIST guidelines in perspective to mark down if the mobile testing framework
have available options to represent and examine privacy mechanisms comprehensively. Our findings may help in the
development of a comprehensive privacy design for apps development, inspection and screening.
4 Results
Based on our methodology, we have drafted manual analysis report from a privacy policy and general settings points
of view. After that, we have created a static and dynamic analysis results table for each app in different scenarios,
for example, apps permission (camera, microphone, location, contacts, Bluetooth, storage, memory, etc.), privacy
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architectural requirement, communication and inter process communication security, and policy based on particular
evaluation.
4.1 Manual Analysis
In manual analysis, we covered mainly three particular topics: Privacy policy, apps permission and general features
related to privacy. Table2 represents the lists of existing characteristics to better understand the attributes to be factored
in our evaluation as a form of score or percentage.
Table 2: Apps General and Privacy Features from Apps’ Manual Analysis
Features App Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
General Features
1. Actionable Application Lock X X X X X X X X X X X X
2. Option to Change
Preferred Language X X X X X X X X X X X X
3. Auto suggest and option
to give feedback 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 X 7 7
4.Good Performance in
constrained environment  X       X X  
5. Storage Backup   X 7 X X    X 7 X
6. Screen lock  X X 7 X X X X X X 7 X
7. On-tap connect of configuring X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7
8. Emergency Access feature by
other trusted party of the users 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
9. Simpler Interface X X X X X X X X X X X
Privacy Features
1. Decoded Privacy Policy X X X X X 7 X X X X X X
2. Well described Compliance:
with EU/US certificate X 7 X 7 X 7 X X X X  X
3. Homepage Privacy Tips 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 7 7 X
4. Doesn’t store any
Personal Information X 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 X 7 X
5. Doesn’t Store IP address X 7  7 X 7 X X  X 7 X
6. Doesn’t hold sensitive
data for long X X 7 X X X X 7 7 X 7 7
7.Use local HTML5 to store
content information 7 X 7 7 X 7 7 7  7  X
8.Clear all data after use X X  X X 7 X 7 7 X 7 X
9. Smart Encryption X X X X X X X X X X X X
10. Two-Factor Authentication 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
11. Secure Communication X X X X X X X X X X X X
12. Secure Registration and Screen lock  X X X X X X X X X X X
13. Security Audit and Grading X 7 7 X X X X 7 X 7 7 X
14.Apps Cloud Security   X         
15. Privacy and Security Certification 7 7 7 7 X  7 7 7 7 7
16. Apps Complies with Privacy
standards and Principles  7 X 7 X 7 X 7    X
 : not-mentioned
X: Feature Presents in them
7: Feature doesn’t present in them
4.1.1 Privacy Policy Inspection
To maintain transparency on handing users’ personal information provided through apps and to give an outline of
the terms of use and to outline the terms of use of the apps, a comprehensive and clear privacy policy is important.
According to the iOS platform’s general criteria of publishing apps, they must have a privacy policy if the app involves
collecting, processing or sharing personal data of users with other parties or even storing and processing user data for
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their own application development process 7. Furthermore, an app needs a privacy policy even if it does not collect this
kind of data itself but instead uses third-party tools like mobile analytics to collect and process data . iOS developers
must read and agree to Apple Review Guidelines, a summary version based on their “Program License Agreement
(PLA)” and other legal documents, in order to have their apps published on Apple App Store. iOS apps may get rejected
if they do not add the URL to their privacy policy when they submit the app for review 8.
Our evaluation of privacy policies started with the language inspection to audit if policies are in standard English. Each
apps policy met the requirements. Keeping iOS platform restrictions and App Store review guidelines in mind, we
studied the privacy policy of the 12 selected apps, and we found that 2 of those apps (app 10 and 12) did not have
detailed privacy policy regarding their data collection and sharing, even though those apps are intended for privacy
protection. Most of the apps did provide privacy policy and some with dubious statement in terms of malicious or
unintentional data leakage, data breach and sharing. We also found some nontransparent policies regarding sharing
users’ information with third parties, which somehow may meet the goals described in privacy policy. Another issue
has been found in case of Cloud usage through apps for users’ data storage and backup, for example, apps providing
secure vault for storing file, images, and videos. Perhaps statements on data minimization and retention can be more
clear and transparent. However, excluding only one selected app, their privacy policies did not explain how the app’s
Cloud security is performing and how privacy of that data is ensured, and most importantly how long that data will be
there. Another significant point was privacy and security certification that has not been in practice in respect to our
selected apps. Certification is a way to ensure credibility and build trust between users and organization. With the
advancement of technology, most of the big tech giants and technological industries are concerned about valid product
and service certifications which make them trustworthy to users/consumers. In the mobile apps scenario, this particular
trend is missing. We found only 1 app out of 12 was maintaining privacy and security certification. While we started
looking for standards followed in apps’ development stage and compliance with privacy standards and principles, we
found only 3 apps out of 12 meet this requirement. Overall, we can conclude that manual analysis presents a lack of
consideration on transparent statement on storage backups in privacy policy, app’s cloud security measurement, lack
of practice in compliance with privacy standards and principles, and validation and audited by privacy and security
certification in our evaluated 12 privacy apps.
4.1.2 General and Privacy Features
After thoroughly inspected privacy policy for each apps, we moved forward with apps general characteristics which
includes both general and privacy features. For this stage of our work, we did not have any particular benchmark to
collect specific information from apps specific web page or directly from apps while using those. We generally went
through all the contents found in the Apps Store and screened through all the tabs and possible option during using those
apps. We recorded the general features and the privacy and security components they mentioned and deployed to provide
different functionalities and privacy preserving environment to their users. Some of these components are: users’ control
over their data, smart encryption, decoded privacy policy, privacy grading based on tracker, and extra privacy features,
personalized biometric locks options, security audits, data backups and so on. From the collected information on general
and privacy features, we have noticed a bunch of handful functionalities. With keeping a note on performance of apps,
we found lack of information regarding the performance of those apps in case of constrained environment, for example,
with low bandwidth, high traffic and so on. As all of the apps require an internet connection, apps performance is a
kind of information that might be taken under consideration. At least, there should have information about those apps’
performance statistics by some degree. In addition, these apps employ different privacy mechanisms, like encryption,
which requires a high mathematical computation that can slow down apps’ performance in run-time. We noticed only
very few apps mentioned their consistency and lack of backing in different environment. From our observation, we
found Only 3 of the 12 apps had good performance in a constrained environment. Table 2 shows the overall recorded
report from our 12 selected privacy apps for iOS mobile device on their basic requirements.
4.1.3 Permission Analysis
For preserving privacy of users’ information on apps’ platforms, one who is using those apps must grant permission to
access personal information. This is sometimes useful if apps are using different information, for example, location,
reminders to make our regular events convenient. While it is about privacy, users expect some level of privacy. If some
permission request is not relevant of that apps’ purpose, it might seems a bit dubious when there is not enough explicitly
mentioned description and policy in app’s web page. To analyze the permission requests of the selected privacy apps,
we recorded the permissions listings from the IPA Manifest files of the 12 selected privacy apps. We categorized those
permissions listings. Two main types of permission requests were found: severe permission and normal permission. In
7Apple developer documentation. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/
8App Store Review Guidelines. https://developer.apple.com/appstore/review/guidelines/privacy
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Figure 3: Summary of Permission requests
our category of permission, we decided to include all of the permission requests mentioned in the iOS platform. Those
are: photo, calendar, camera, location when in use, location always, location description, microphone, Apple music,
bluetooth, and contacts. Figure 3 summarizes the requested permissions and represents the permission requests found
by utilizing Mobile Security Framework.
From our experiment, we found that several apps have requested permission beyond their scope. For instance, four
apps required access to the photo library and some of them are also requesting it without any obvious reason since
we only had two apps in our list for the purpose of protecting photo and videos. While none of the apps in this study
required any Bluetooth functionality or connectivity to a paired device, oddly, one of the applications requested for
Bluetooth permission. According to our understanding, these additional permissions were requested for ad libraries,
which exploit Bluetooth devices to track a user’s location. Notably, iOS required apps that performed scanning for
hardware identifiers, like WiFi or Bluetooth, to request the location permission in direct approach with short alert
message in their device to ask for granting permission for obtaining location information. Nevertheless, one of the
studied apps requested permissions to access location and coarse location. Three of the apps requested calendars
permission while two asked for camera permission. While only three apps needed access to the calendar, one more
asked for access to the contacts list. One application requested access to Apple music permission. Remarkably, in most
cases, permission requested by those apps do not have explicitly any functionality justifying such permission requests.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of overall permission requests.
4.2 Static Analysis
For the static analysis, we evaluated the privacy and security and permission of the apps in detail. We examined each
app independently using MobSF framework. The analysis revealed several privacy and security issues summarized
in Table 3. Mainly we evaluated App transport security, static code analysis of IPA library and permissions. From
2016’s Data submission, Global survey of OWASP, the top 10 categories are focused towards Mobile applications [28].
Insecure communication is one of top issues in mobile application since those applications are basically designed by
client-server fashion while they transfer any information. We carry our mobile phone everywhere with us which make it
more prone to network traffic where targeted attack is easier to perform.
Table 3: Results of Static Code Analysis
Code Analysis Percentage
Insecure API(s) 67
Insecure login Function 83
Insecure Random Number Generator 75
No nemory protection mechanism (ASLR) 25
Insecure WebView Implementation 50
Insecure Implementation of SSL 58
In most cases, mobile application use TLS/SSL at the time of authentication but not elsewhere. This can lead to data
risk and session IDs. If adversaries get idea about users’ information, that attack can be more targeted in different
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form. Poor SSL setup can also facilitate phishing and MITM attacks 9. In the same way, insecure login function,
insecure authorization and authentication have been creating a sparse attack vector by utilizing automated/bot attacks
and custom-built tools. Here, we can mention our permission request analysis in our earlier section of this paper. If
apps are performing the user’s roles or permissions to the backend system as part of a request, then it clearly shows
that this app has issues with authorization. From our experiment by MobSF Framework, we have found 83% of our
smartphone privacy apps have insecure login function. For protecting system, there is a technology called ASLR
(Address Space Layout Randomization) memory protection mechanism to help prevent attacks and shellcode from
being successful. It esssentially protects system against buffer overflow attacks for which adversaries need to know
where each part of the program is located in memory. ASLR randomly offsets the location of modules and certain
in-memory structures to prevent this attack. 25% of our selected apps do not have memory protection mechanism. On
iOS platforms, apps are compiled with an Automatic Reference Counting (ARC) flag, which is a compiler that provides
automatic memory management that reduces privacy and security risks against memory corruption and vulnerabilities.
We found a larger portion of those apps were compiled with a Position Independent Executable (PIE) flag that address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) which is also a memory protection mechanism to reduce memory corruption
related vulnerabilities, while some apps were compiled with a Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) flag that builds protection
against Stack Overflows attacks. From our static analysis, we also found some issues, such as insecure random number
generators, which appear quite often, though not all qualified as significant. In most cases, random number generators
usage was not necessarily related to security or privacy violations. Our framework evaluation also showed that 67% of
the apps have insecure API. Many of the apps do not use HTTPS while connecting, which is alarming, and raise several
issues concerning WebViews components as we mentioned for API. 58% apps have an insecure SSL connection and we
examined it in further in our analysis by utilizing SSL lab.
In addition, we investigated more on Apps’ transport Security. An application needs to have ATS (Apps Transport
Security) enabled to have secure communication. Insufficient transport security can lead to great impact on confi-
dentiality of users’ information, more specifically, this is a wide area of research in respect to the practice of data
transmission of eHealth apps [29], as well as safety issues regarding data integrity [30], [31]. In case of iOS, this is a
privacy feature that should be enabled by default when new apps are installed and enforces secure connections. ATS
requires that all HTTP connections made with the URL Loading System—typically using the URLSession class-use
HTTPS. It also includes extended security checks that conduct server trust evaluation prescribed by the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol and the main task of ATS to block connections that fail to meet minimum security
specifications. It is also possible to remove and minimize requirements for communication with specific servers using
the NSExceptionDomains key. From our app collections, we have found 3 apps have an insecure transport layer. Two
of those three have their ATS disabled on "NSAllowsArbitraryLoads" for webviews. Another has ATS disabled for
"Facebook.com", "Nomobileleads.com" and "Trymobilevpn.com" domains. Table 4 presents the status of ATS security
level and issue found from our experiment.
4.3 Dynamic Analysis
During our dynamic analysis, we evaluated the apps in run-time using the selected apps on our devices to identify
their communication channels. We considered their corresponding privacy and security attributes to find out if they
transmit sensitive and personal data or any media that is not mentioned in their primary information over the Internet to
unauthorized parties [32][33]. We have identified some data types from previous researches and grouped accordingly,
for example, multimedia, location that apps transmitted, registration and log-in data, e-mails, device I.D., search
queries, OS information, and chat sessions. First, we examined the ATS (Apps Transport Security) mentioned in the
record of static analysis to validate if potential insecure communication exists as found from static information. In
iOS, App Transport Security (ATS) is used for security checks. When iOS operating system builds connections with
NSURLConnection, NSURLSession and CFURL to public host-names, it requires some enforced requirement which is
included in ATS. To maintain a secure transport, ATS should be enabled by default for applications running on iOS.
When there are inconsistencies in enabling ATS for particular domains, it creates an insecure connection. Therefore, for
any connection made to an IP address, unauthorized domain names of local are not protected with ATS 10. Overall, the
requirements of ATS are following:
HTTP connections are not allowed.
X.509 Certificate has a SHA256 fingerprint and must be signed with at least a 2048-bit RSA key or a 256-bit
Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) key
9OWASP Mobile Top 10. Retrieved from https://owasp.org/www-project-mobile-top-10/
10https://support.apple.com/guide/security/welcome/web
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) version must be 1.2 or above and must support Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) through
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) key exchange and AES-128 or AES-256 symmetric ciphers.
According to these requirements, we recorded the ATS overall status and causes for 12 selected privacy apps.
Table 4: Apps Transport Security
Description Issue Status App
ATS is enabled None Secure 1
ATS is disabled on domain
’’NSAllowsArbitraryLoads’: True Present Insecure 2
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 3
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 4
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 5
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 6
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 7
ATS is disabled on domain
’’NSAllowsArbitraryLoads’: True’that
allow insecure communication and
loads for web views Present Insecure 8
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 9
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 10
ATS is disabled domain ’facebook.com’
ATS is disabled on ’nomobileads.com’
ATS is disabled on’trymobilevpn.com Present Insecure 11
No insecure connections
configured ATS is enabled None Secure 12
After the apps’ transport security analysis, we can see that some of the apps’ App Transport Security (ATS) is disabled
on the domain ”NSAllowsArbitraryLoads:’ True. Deactivating ATS means allowing insecure communication with
particular unauthorized servers, and therefore allowing insecure media loads for apps web views [31]. Table 4 shows
the result of ATS issues, status with description.
We also performed a privacy and security analysis while users interacted with those apps. We identified web traffic and
data transmission nature by using Fiddler web debugging tool. This tool has a web filter and also a proxy. Normally
the developer uses these tools for testing their application. Sometimes, with all changes in SSL, applications can be
blocked, and it is difficult where this application is trying to go. In those cases, developers troubleshoot by using Fiddler
to find the websites that create those exclusions.
4.4 NIST 1800-21 and OWASP Assessment
Apart from our previously described evaluations and different types of analysis, we also proceeded to an additional
evaluation process in order to check and validate the requirements that the apps should meet in order to ensure data
protection for users. We briefly studied NIST: NCCoE Component for Risk assessments, which include threat source,
threat event, vulnerabilities, and some others. For our particular assessment and validation, we chose to delve into
threat events and countermeasures to combat those. From NIST, we found 12 threat events, which is called T12 [34],
and which includes: unauthorized access, credential theft, confidentiality and integrity, violation of privacy, network
communication, unencrypted communication, device unlock code, storage vulnerabilities, device compromise, data
loss, and unauthorized storage [22]. Using the NIST risk assessment, we created our list of countermeasures for seven
primary threats and the requirements for those measures. Our selected measures for comprehensive privacy design
included: architecture and design, data storage, cryptography, authentication, network communication, and code quality.
With briefly defined protection mechanisms and the threat definition of NIST 1800-21: Mobile Device Security
requirements and mobile application testing tools and methods presented in OWASP, we performed an evaluation to
compare and contrast. In this section, we reevaluated the results from previous sections and aligned them with the
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Figure 4: Final apps presentation with percentage of requirements
requirements of NIST and OWASP guidelines to find out what they were lacking [22], [23], [35]. From our examination,
we concluded that the requirements showed in Table 5 may help mobile apps privacy testing community to reconsider a
few mechanisms and add a few features. We included the results for functional data protection requirements of NIST,
such as privacy design and architecture, encryption, secure transmission or/and strong authentication. We present our
results for the 12 apps accordingly. Table 5 shows the final results with NIST requirements.
5 Discussion
Smartphone app developers have many opportunities to create, collect, and share data about their users. Users might
be unaware of the data collection, particularly when it is performed by sensors running in the background. Although
this data can be used to create a better customer experience, it can also be used to make unsettling inferences about
the app users’ habits, lifestyles, locations, and other information [36]. These are creating privacy risks. While these
are privacy apps, the issues can be more broadly serious. Privacy apps are mainly based on preserving users’ privacy.
However, there still needs to be analyses to validate these kinds of apps if they are including proper privacy mechanisms
and following privacy specific guidelines. Despite the privacy risks of this unprecedented access to data, many app
developers are neither privacy nor security experts. The app development workforce is highly fragmented. Apps are
often initially developed by independent developers or small start-ups, as opposed to large, established corporations.
This fragmented market means that many independent developers with limited privacy experience and fewer personnel
and resources are making privacy decisions about their users’ sensitive data and privacy mechanisms. To examine how
app developers make privacy decisions, including what kind of privacy guidelines and mechanisms they are using, our
study sheds light a on the lack of privacy mechanisms in existing privacy apps (the 12 selected privacy apps).
US government agencies, trade associations, and advocacy groups have released app developer guidelines, and different
documents describe how developers can protect user privacy. For example, the Federal Trade Commission released
a staff report on mobile privacy disclosures, and the California Attorney General provided recommendations for
privacy in the mobile ecosystem. To synthesize these different documents, the International Association of Privacy
Professionals (IAPP) created a Web tool that lets readers access, search, and compare 10 different privacy guidelines
from the US, Australia, and Europe 11. We examined the documents in the IAPP Mobile App Privacy Tool. For more
technical guidance for mobile apps developers, NIST also published a comprehensive guideline with privacy threats
and requirements. The guidelines often overlap, making it feasible to comply with most or all procedures. For our
evaluation process, we have used the NIST guideline to compare our experimental results.
For our experiment and analyses, we selected 12 privacy apps and to avoid legal issues, we chose to present them as
App 1-12, rather than revealing their names. We performed three forms of analyses: manual, static and dynamic. From
the very first analysis, we obtained apps’ general and privacy features provided and claimed apps’ specific sites (Table
2). We were able to see almost perfect privacy features that have been used to develop their privacy apps. All of the
apps include smart encryption, extra privacy registration PIN, secure communication, and secure data management,
which are the most important criteria to provide privacy to users. In this stage, we have also done permission analyses
with each apps’ IPA file to investigate if they are allowing any dangerous permission or not. Unlike android apps, they
are not giving a lot of dangerous permission [14]. Still, a few of the apps are requiring dangerous permissions like
11Mobile Privacy Disclosures. Building Trust Through Transparency. FTC Staff Report | February 2013. Retrieved from
https://www.ftc.gov/
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Table 5: Selected Apps’ Privacy and Security Checklist based on NIST and OWASP
General Features App Number
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Architecture and design
1. Security controls at Client side X X X X 7 7 X 7 X 7 7 X
2. High-level privacy architecture X 7 7 7 X 7 X X X X 7 X
3. Clear context of data sensitivity X X 7 7 X X X 7 X X 7 X
4. Defined security functionality of content X 7 X 7 X 7 X X X X 7 X
5. Threat model,countermeasures 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 X X 7 X
6. Explicit key-management standard (NIST SP 800-57) X X X X X X X X 7 X 7 X
7. Mechanism for enforcing updates 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 X X X 7 7
8. Privacy addressing in soft development life cycle 7 7 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 X 7 X
Data Storage and Privacy X X X 7 X X X X 7 X 7 X
1. Cryptographic keys for sensitive Info X X 7 X X X X X X X 7 7
2. Doesn’t storage data Outside container X 7 7 7 7 X X X X X 7 X
3. Cryptographic keys for sensitive X X 7 X X X X X X 7 7 X
4. Doesn’t share data with 3rd parties 7 7 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 7 X
5. Sensitive data exposition via IPC mechanisms. 7 7 X 7 X 7 X 7 X X 7 7
6. Passwords or pins exposition through
user interface X X X 7 7 X X X X X 7 X
7. Doesn’t hold sensitive data for long X X 7 7 7 X X X X X 7 X
8. App have education materials for users X 7 7 7 7 7 X X X X 7 X
Cryptography
1. Symmetric cryptography with hardcoded
keys as a sole method of encryption. X X X X X X X X X X 7 X
2. Implementations of cryptographic
primitives. X X X X X X X X 7 7 7 7
3. Doesn’t re-use the same cryptographic
key for multiple purposes X 7 X 7 X 7 X X 7 7 7 X
4. All random values are generated using
secure random number generator 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 X X 7 X
Authentication and Session Management
1. Stateful session management X 7 7 X X X X X X X 7 7
2. Provides access to a remote service X 7 7 7 X X X X 7 X 7 X
3. Terminates existing session on logout X X X 7 X X X X 7 7 7 X
4. Biometric authentication 7 7 X X X 7 7 X X X 7 X
5. 2FA authentication 7 7 7 7 X 7 7 X X X X X
Network Communication
1.Data encrypted on network using TLS X X 7 X X 7 X X X X 7 7
2.Verifies X.509 certificate of
remote endpoint 7 7 7 7 X X 7 X X X 7 X
3. Doesn’t rely on a single insecure
communication channel X 7 X X X 7 X X X X 7 7
4. depends on up-to-date connectivity and
security libraries X 7 X 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 X
Platform Interaction
1.Requests minimum set of permissions X X X 7 X X X X X X 7 X
2.Doesn’t export sensitive functionality
via custom URL scheme X X X X X X X X X X 7 X
3.Doesn’t export sensitive functionality
by IPC facilities X X X 7 7 7 X X X 7 7 X
4. JavaScript is disabled in WebViews X X X X X X X X X 7 7 X
Code Quality and Build Settings
1.Signed and provisioned with valid
certificate X X 7 7 7 7 7 X X X 7 X
2.In unmanaged code, memory is allocated,
freed and used securely 7 7 7 X X 7 X X X X X X
3. Free security features offered
by the toolchain X X X X X 7 X X X 7 7 7
X: Features Presents in them
7: Feature doesn’t present in them
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photo (4 apps), calendars (3 apps), camera (2 apps), location (1 app), Bluetooth (1 app), music (1 app), contacts (1
app). From the static analysis, we recorded a deficiency in coding in terms of log in, random number generator, SQLite
database, etc. We have also found insecure connections in apps’ transport security for 3 apps from them and those are
severe where even ATS is not enabled. As privacy apps, we expected not to have any third party involvement. However,
almost all the apps have third parties involved in users’ data. Though the number are less than any android or any other
apps in iOS, this is still concerning in terms of privacy apps. We have identified HTTP connection to 3rd parties per
SSL with grades where there exist some grades that are not expected for privacy apps.
At the end of all experiments, we compared our results with NIST and OWASP guidelines to validate our findings. We
have observed a huge gap in what we have got in our initial manual analysis in apps specific sites and what we got from
our analyses result. There is scope for improvement of these apps from the permission requirement, HTTP connection,
Apps Transport security point of view. As those apps are developed by multiple developers, they might follow different
privacy guideline and requirements. In this case, we can suggest them to utilize comprehensive apps privacy guideline
6 Conclusion
Privacy apps includes mechanism that can ensure a certain level of data protection among cellphone. To validate those
apps credibility, there needs a concrete guideline and certification process in their development life cycle. Nowadays, it
is common in a wide marketplace of apps for developers to follow different self-regulatory guidelines. Even though
the availability of development tools and comparably easy ways to publish apps in the market, amateurs do not even
follow guidelines to ensure criteria of privacy mechanisms which eventually make users vulnerable. In particularly,
for privacy apps development, it is crucial to follow widely recognized privacy guidelines. Through our research, we
assessed the current state of practices for developing privacy apps. Our analyses of selected privacy apps identified their
lacking in security and privacy mechanisms that can lead users to great vulnerabilities in case of data transfer, duration
of data storage, inter-process communication, apps transport security, and apps permission requests, Our comparison
and contrast with our findings based on NIST guidelines and another operational guideline (OWASP) requirements and
controls highlighted the shortcomings of those apps. In addition, it also showed the lacking in the comprehensiveness in
the framework that we utilized for our experiment which do not measure up to privacy mechanisms very well since
those are basically developed to lean solely towards security aspects. Our overall results may help developers with
further improvement of privacy apps’ design and development. For easily implementable privacy standards for apps
development, a comprehensive privacy design with proper requirements will be a good start.
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